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Abstract  
Within the literature on street-level workers’ encounters with citizens it is generally known that 
bureaucrats’ decision making is partly dependent on the relationship they have with them. 
Within policy areas that promote notions as trust and responsiveness, bureaucrats’ relationship 
with citizen-clients becomes even more crucial. Very little is known about what frontline 
workers deem trustworthy and untrustworthy citizen-clients in the first place, and how they 
know they have to do with either a trustworthy or untrustworthy citizen-client. The street-level 
bureaucracy literature suggests that frontline workers rely on universalistic standards of 
deservingness, but also on particularistic attributes such as ethnicity and socio-economic 
background to categorize citizen-clients. Such attributes are commonly believed to signal an 
unobservable characteristic, such as a citizen-client’s general ability. Belonging to a certain 
social grouping, then, serves as ‘a signal’ that one is, for example, either competent or 
incompetent. In line with signaling theory (Spence, 1973; Weiss, 1995), existing research thus 
emphasizes the information problem street-level bureaucrats encounter in ‘getting a grip’ on 
citizen-clients. Drawing on status characteristics theory (Ridgeway, 1991) this study 
scrutinizes the epistemological problem too, i.e. how street-level bureaucrats know, by 
focusing on how their interpretation of signals is influenced by citizen-clients’ status 
characteristics. By analyzing eleven semi-structured interviews with tax officials who inspect 
the acceptability of entrepreneurs’ tax returns, this study shows the role signals and status 
characteristics play in their evaluation of citizen-clients’ trustworthiness. 
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Introduction  
Within the literature on street-level workers’ encounters with citizens it is generally known that 
bureaucrats’ decision making is partly dependent on the relationship they have with them 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Harrits and Møller, 2014). It is held that encounters are 
determined by norms that are shared by larger society, such as, for instance, the universalistic 
standards of supporting needy people in worker-applicant encounters. However, it is also 
argued that some rules are generated ad hoc in the interaction, which ‘are the particularistic 
attributes’ that are formally deemed illegitimate (Erickson, 1975: 50). Examples of such 
particularistic factors are a client’s ethnicity or his or her socio-economic background. While 
particularistic factors may be relevant in the official-client encounter, they are not 
automatically salient (Erickson, 1975). It is argued that what is established between the official 
and client in the encounter, influences whether certain factors play or do not play a role (ibid.; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003). Erickson (1975: 50) refers to ‘a feeling of commonality 
and solidarity between the participants’ and to ‘a shared style of communication and self-
presentation’, whereas Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) speak of ‘cultural abidance’ to 
delineate the interactional processes through which particularistic factors play a role. The 
official’s own cultural understandings and normative standards of how things should be, then, 
are leading in the decision who gets what. 
Whereas much of the literature on the role of stereotypes or social types in official-
client interactions focuses on aspects of identity, and the bureaucratic process through which 
clients are categorized, much less attention has been paid to the question how individual 
bureaucrats know they have to do with a certain ‘type of client’. This is striking, since 
uncertainty is deemed the most defining characteristic of frontline work; street-level 
bureaucrats’ endeavor ‘to get a grip’ on citizen-clients is pervaded by a deep uncertainty 
(Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Wagenaar, 2004). It has been argued that bureaucrats 
look for certain cues or signals in order to categorize clients (Mennerick, 1974). Whereas some 
signals are pre-determined by the organization for which an official works, other signals 
bureaucrats look for are indeterminate and dependent on the interaction with the client. This 
way, however, social typologies or stereotypes are given the possibility to come into the 
encounter ‘through the backdoor’, since they offer bureaucrats strategic information that is 
lacking in the formal role descriptions (Mennerick, 1974). These social typologies ‘allow both 
service workers and clients to fill in the gap between merely knowing the other’s formal status 
and being acquainted intimately with him’ (ibid.: 398-99). How social typologies affect the 
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interpretation of other signals or cues and, hence, affect bureaucrats’ decision-making is, 
however, an underexplored theme within research on public encounters.  
This question becomes all the more relevant given the fact that street-level bureaucrats’ 
interpretations of the situation at hand play a more prominent role in today’s ‘horizontal 
policies’, promoting notions as trust and commitment between public officials and citizen-
clients (e.g. Yang, 2005; Peters, 2004; Stivers, 1994). Trust, as a reciprocal notion, shifts the 
attention from predetermined rules and procedures to aspects of the interaction (Yang, 2005; 
Stivers, 1994). These trust-based policies, then, urge street-level workers to judge whether 
citizen-clients are trustworthy or untrustworthy based on the interaction. However, very little 
is known about what frontline workers deem trustworthy and untrustworthy citizen-clients in 
the first place, and how they know they have to do with either a trustworthy citizen-client or 
untrustworthy citizen-client.  
By analyzing eleven semi-structured interviews with tax officials who inspect the 
acceptability of entrepreneurs’ tax returns, this study aims to examine what signals they look 
at in getting a grip on citizen-clients, and moreover, how citizen-clients’ status characteristics 
influence their interpretation of signals. By drawing on signaling and screening theory 
originating from the field of economics (Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1974) and the sociological 
status characteristics theory (Ridgeway, 1991; 2014), we will discuss in the following section 
how citizen-clients could be sorted according to certain characteristics linked to unobserved 
properties, and how bureaucrats’ cultural status beliefs about group differences could affect 
their interpretation of certain signals. Subsequently, we will discuss our methods and present 
our findings. In the last section we will discuss our findings and offer recommendations for 
future research.  
 
Signaling theory and status characteristics theory 
Within the field of economics it has been acknowledged that encounters between actors within 
the market economy, such as the labor market, are fraught with uncertainty. The fact that an 
individual’s productive capacities are not directly observable and need to be learned over time, 
it is held, makes hiring an investment decision that is made under uncertainty (Spence, 1973). 
It is even argued that ‘to hire someone, then, is frequently to purchase a lottery’ (ibid: 356). 
Signaling theory holds, in this regard, that people who find themselves in these uncertain 
situations, look for observable, personal attributes that are believed to be linked to the sought 
after unobservable characteristics, ‘and it is these that must ultimately determine his assessment 
of the lottery he is buying’ (ibid.: 357). Since firms cannot observe worker productivity 
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directly, they ‘use education choices to draw inferences about unobserved attributes’ (Weiss 
1995: 135). Observable traits that form the image of an individual vary from fairly fixed ones 
such as race and sex to alterable ones that are subject to manipulation such as education 
(Spence, 1973).  
This theory moreover assumes that the signaling game is played out in a ‘calculative 
way’, i.e. that people look for costly signals in order to separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ individuals. 
Costly signals are observable attributes that are too costly for an imposter to fake, but affordable 
for an honest individual, ‘given the benefit that each can expect in the situation’ (Gambetta & 
Hamill, 2005: 11). Manipulating one’s skin color, for example, might be hardly feasible and a 
costly endeavor given the benefit one is looking after, such as for instance being picked up by 
a taxi driver in a predominantly white neighborhood. A distinction is made between signals 
that are ‘perfectly sorting’ and signals that are ‘semi-sorting’. No mimicry is possible in the 
case of signals that are perfectly sorting, such as for instance someone’s DNA or face (ibid.). 
In real-world situations most signals are however not perfectly sorting. An example of this is 
the image drawn by Stone (1984) of the benefit applicant faking disability by walking with 
crutches; this signal might be costly because of the risk the imposter runs of getting a penalty, 
but of which the benefits might also outweigh the risk. Following this theory, the assumption 
is that a street-level bureaucrat would not be easily persuaded with this easily to manipulate 
sign. Hence, s/he will screen citizen-clients for observable costly signs that are rather fixed and 
not easily manipulated, and, if possible, for clusters of costly signs.  
Within the street-level bureaucracy literature, however, it is by now common wisdom 
that frontline workers are not mere rational calculators preoccupied with weighing costs and 
benefits to determine the ‘most appropriate’ decision (e.g. Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003). Rather, they make decisions based on the relationship they have with citizen-
clients, thereby pursuing cultural abidance rather than rule abidance (Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003). By providing extraordinary services to worthy clients, street-level workers ‘will 
risk careers, reduce the bureaucratic measure of their success, and make their jobs more difficult 
and more dangerous’ (ibid: 156). This finding bears witness to the importance of workers’ own 
cultural norms and values in making decisions. This given, however, does not rule out the 
possibility that frontline workers indeed look for costly signs, to assure themselves they 
correctly distinguished the honest citizen-client from the ‘villain’. Especially since 
distinguishing ‘the real needy’ people from impostors has always been considered an integral 
part of street-level work (Stone, 1984). The concept of disability, notably, ‘has always been 
based on a perceived need to detect perception’ (ibid: 23), since people are assumed to have 
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incentives to escape the labor market. Hence, determining whether citizen-clients are 
trustworthy and honest has traditionally been part and parcel of street-level bureaucrats’ work.  
  We, in fact, expect that street-level bureaucrats’ interpretation of cues and signals to 
assess citizen-clients’ trustworthiness is inextricably linked to their cultural beliefs regarding 
the latter. It is has been shown that, due to a lack of information, time and other resources, street-
level bureaucrats develop shortcuts such as stereotyping to categorize clients (Lipsky, 1980;  
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Prottas, 1979). This is especially the case when street-level 
workers have short-term interactions with citizens and, therefore, have little time to get a sense 
of who the citizen is. When street-level workers need to make quick judgments, they tend to 
reinforce stereotyped or stigmatized identities (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003). In this 
regard, Berger et al. (1972), citing Simmel (1908), argue you might know an individual from 
direct experience, but also from the individual’s status category. Status characteristics are 
associated with ‘cultural beliefs of greater competence in those with more valued states of the 
characteristic’ (Ridgeway, 1991: 368). These characteristics are socially recognized attributes on 
which people are perceived to differ, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, education, and of which 
the states are differently evaluated, that is, negatively and positively.  
 Status characteristics theory holds that the differently evaluated states of a status 
characteristic only play a role when a person in a particular situation associates with these states 
specific expectations for behavior and/or a general expectation state, which are, in turn, also 
evaluated either negatively or positively (Berger et al., 1972). Whereas specific expectations refer 
to defined situations, general expectations do not refer to specified situations. An example of the 
former is the expectation that females take more caring responsibilities for their children than 
their male counterparts, and an example of the latter is the expectation that females, in general, 
are more considerate than males. These evaluations do not stand alone but are often made within 
settings centered on a ‘valued task’, that is, a task having a good answer defined as ‘success’ and 
a bad answer defined as ‘failure’ (ibid.: 243). Possessing a certain performance characteristic is 
assumed to increase the likelihood of achieving success at the task. Since the evaluator might not 
know who possesses this performance characteristic, s/he looks at status characteristics that fill 
this knowledge gap. Status characteristics do not have to be directly culturally associated with 
this performance characteristic relevant for the situation at hand. The theory holds that if the 
status characteristic has not previously been dissociated from the performance characteristic, and 
is the only basis for social discrimination, this status characteristic will become relevant in this 
situation (Berger et al., 1972.). This means that a status characteristic becomes relevant unless 
the evaluator ‘knows from prior belief that it is not a basis for making inferences’ (ibid.: 245) 
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about the performance characteristic. However, it could of course also be the case that status 
characteristics are culturally associated with performance characteristics.  
Status characteristics theory not only explains why cultural status beliefs could matter 
in the public encounter, but also explains the mechanism by which status characteristics may 
play a role in the assessment of a client’s trustworthiness. The theory predicts that status 
characteristics affect the standards street-level bureaucrats use to evaluate whether a citizen-
client is trustworthy or not. As performance expectations for low status citizen-clients are lower 
than those for high status clients, a high performance of a low status citizen-client will be 
inconsistent with the expectations for lower status citizen-clients. As a result, double standards 
theory holds, standards will be stricter for lower status citizen-clients. The opposite also holds: 
as high performance is consistent with performance expectations for high status citizen-clients, 
the consistency between observation and expectation will lead to loosening the criteria (Correll 
and Benard, 2006). Hence, status characteristics will affect bureaucrats’ decision making in a 
self-fulfilling manner leading to a ‘hierarchy of evaluation’ (Correll and Ridgeway, 2003: 29). 
Our study focuses on frontline tax workers who inspect the tax returns of small 
entrepreneurs. Tax workers’ main task is to evaluate whether entrepreneurs’ accounting records 
are acceptable. In determining the acceptability of the entrepreneurs’ accounting records, tax 
workers then look at whether entrepreneurs are trustworthy. They generally look at two aspects 
of trustworthiness – intentions and competences – to look at whether some sort of fraud might 
be involved, or whether it is a mere ‘fault’; the evaluation which in turn influences workers’ 
willingness to reach a compromise and, hence, the height of the fine. This also aligns with the 
model of trustworthiness as outlined by Mayer et al. (1995) which distinguishes three 
trustworthiness aspects: ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability refers to the competencies that 
enable an individual ‘to have influence within some specific domain’ (ibid.: 717). In our study, 
competence refers to entrepreneurs’ abilities and skills to hold proper accounting records, and 
thus, to abide by the law. Benevolence refers to the extent the trustee is believed to have good 
intentions towards the trustor, which is held to be inversely related to a trustee’s motivation to lie 
(ibid.). Integrity refers to the acceptability of a trustee’s adherence to certain principles. In our 
study, assessments of citizen-clients’ intentions in general are explored, which could both cover 
intentions towards the tax administration as intentions ‘in doing business’. Since these properties 
are not readily observable, we examine how tax workers know whether they have to do with 
either a trustworthy or an untrustworthy citizen-client. In order to answer this question, we will 
examine whether and how tax workers’ evaluation of citizen-clients’ trustworthiness is related 
to the costliness of signals and cues and status characteristics.  
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Case selection 
This research is conducted within the Dutch tax administration and focuses on frontline tax 
workers who audit tax returns of small businesses, and have face-to-face interactions with 
citizen-clients as part of their job. Under the heading of the so-called ‘horizontal supervision’ 
approach, the Dutch tax administration has moved from a vertical command and control approach 
to responsive and collaborative regulation and enforcement (Gribnau 2007). The official/client 
interface, then, is not seen as merely an administrative, neutral process necessary to implement 
policies and in which public officials should be strictly regulated, but as an essential aspect of 
cooperative and responsive regulation: ‘the treatment of taxpayers is based on mutual trust and 
reciprocity to which good communication is crucial’ (Gribnau 2007: 325). Within the Dutch tax 
administration, frontline tax workers audit administrations with the adage that ‘good is good 
enough’, meaning that they are encouraged to not correct each fault they find and to make 
agreements with citizen-clients for the future when possible. For this reason and because of the 
limited time bureaucrats have to gather ‘all’ the relevant information, they evaluate ‘the 
acceptability’ of tax returns rather than their mere correctness.  
For the purpose of this study we focused on tax workers who inspect tax returns of small 
companies and thereby have direct interactions with clients, either with or without their 
accountants present. An important part of their work is assessing the gaps in citizen-clients’ tax 
returns. They are guided by questions such as: what caused these gaps, what should be the height 
of the tax correction and should the entrepreneur get a fine? In order to assess the acceptability 
workers examine entrepreneurs’ bookkeeping records, primary administration and operational 
processes. They also assess entrepreneurs’ intentions and competences in order to determine 
whether some kind of fraud may be involved. This, in turn, affects the advice they give to the 
specialist who decides on the fine. Tax workers finalize their audit in a report in which they 
substantiate the decisions on the correction and fine, which is sent to the ‘audit manager’ for a 
last check before it is sent to the citizen-client.  
In order to answer the research question, we looked for tax workers who conduct audits 
and who are given the task of carrying out the ‘horizontal supervision’ policy. For this reason, 
we focused on frontline tax workers auditing the tax returns of small businesses, where this policy 
has been adopted since 2005. Since frontline tax officials’ contact details were not readily 
available, we chose to email managers. Several managers reacted positively to our request to 
interview a small number of frontline tax workers. For this study, eleven frontline tax workers 
from three different offices in the Netherlands were interviewed. Four respondents are female 
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and seven are male. Two respondents have been in service for just over 35 years, one for 24 
years, four for 9 years, and four for less than 5 years.  
Methods  
For the purpose of this study semi-structured interviews were conducted focused on how tax 
workers ‘get a grip’ on the entrepreneur and his/her administration. The interview consisted of 
two successive parts. The first part was inductive and inquired into the sequential process of 
an audit; what does a tax official already know in the beginning of an audit and how does s/he 
know, and what does s/he not know? What does the worker know after the preparatory phase, 
when s/he has not seen the entrepreneur yet, but only the latter’s tax return and audit files? 
How does s/he know? And what does s/he not know? The same questions were asked with 
regards to the introductory meeting when the worker meets the entrepreneur and the latter’s 
possible accountant.  
 The second part of the interview was more structured. A two-by-two scheme was 
presented to the respondents, with two ‘dimensions’ of trustworthiness: competence & 
intentions (see Appendix 1). These two dimensions were found to play an important role in tax 
workers’ daily practices in an earlier study conducted by the first author. The stories frontline 
tax workers told roughly distinguish entrepreneurs who do not have the ability to hold proper 
accounting records on the one hand, and entrepreneurs who intentionally commit fraud on the 
other hand. First, respondents were asked whether these dimensions indeed match their 
working practices, and whether something was missing from it. All respondents recognized 
these dimensions as being an important part of ‘getting to know’ an entrepreneur and his/her 
administration. Then, the respondents were asked whether they could recall situations they 
experienced where they had a strong feeling or idea that an entrepreneur 1) had bad intentions 
and were incompetent 2) had bad intentions, but were competent 3) had good intentions, but 
were incompetent 4) had good intentions, and were competent. They were specifically asked 
how they came to this evaluation. Some respondents could not tell a story about each instance, 
simply because they never experienced it.  
 Both parts of the interviews were analyzed using an open coding strategy, but guided 
by the question what signals and cues frontline workers look at to get a grip on the citizen-
client and his/her administration. Moreover, we looked at respondents’ reasoning of why these 
signals and cues exactly gave them certainty, in order to examine whether their costliness and 
status characteristics play a role. These two concepts were used as sensitizing concepts in the 
analysis. Costly signals and cues are those that are perceived by workers as too costly for a 
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mimic to fake, but affordable for an honest individual. Do workers rely on signals that are, 
according to them, easy to give by honest citizen-clients, but hard for dishonest ones? 
Moreover, we looked at whether and how status characteristics assist workers in evaluating 
citizen-clients’ competences and intentions. We coded a status characteristic as such, when 
respondents hold cultural beliefs that certain ‘types’ of people are better or worse than other 
‘types’ of people, who differ on socially recognized attributes such as ethnicity, gender, 
education, socioeconomic background. According to the theory, status characteristics lead to 
general expectation states and/or specific expectations. Are people with certain status 
characteristics perceived as being more competent or as having better intentions in general 
(general expectation state)? Are people with certain status characteristics deemed, for instance, 
more competent in running a business, and therefore seen as more trustworthy (specific 
expectation)?  
We particularly looked at whether and how certain status characteristics served as 
signals, offering tax officials information they otherwise would not have (information 
problem), and whether and how status characteristics influence their interpretation of other 
signals (epistemological problem). To scrutinize the latter, we studied whether and how 
respondents evaluate the same signal differently for different ‘types’ of people, and whether 
and how they use double standards to evaluate citizen-clients, i.e. whether citizen-clients 
assigned a lower status are scrutinized more critically than higher status citizen-clients, when 
equally signaling good intentions and competence. 
 
Findings  
 
What signals a trustworthy and untrustworthy citizen-client? 
 
 Costly and semi-sorting signals  
 
 Status characteristics’ influence on the interpretation of other signals  
 
 
Conclusion & discussion  
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Appendix 1: Interview grid  
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